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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BEFORE THE HONORABLE VINCE CHHABRIA, JUDGE

IN RE: FACEBOOK, INC. CONSUMER)
PRIVACY USER PROFILE LITIGATION.) NO. 18-MD-2843 VC

NO. 18-MD-2843 VC San Francisco, California Wednesday, July 15, 2020

TRANSCRIPT OF ZOOM VIDEOCONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

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(Appearances continued, next page)

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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 Wednesday, July 15, 2020 9:03 a.m. ---000---3 THE CLERK: Calling Case Number 18-md-2843, In Re 4 5 Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litigation. 6 Counsel for the plaintiff, please state your appearances for the record. 7 MR. LOESER: Good morning, Your Honor. Derek Loeser, 8 from Keller Rohrback, for the plaintiffs. 9 THE COURT: Good morning. 10 11 MS. WEAVER: Good morning, Your Honor. Lesley Weaver, of Bleichmar Fonti, for plaintiffs. And with me is Anne Davis 12 13 and Angelica Ornelas. **THE COURT:** Good morning, everyone. 14 MR. KO: Good morning, Your Honor. David Ko, Keller 15 16 Rohrback, also on behalf of plaintiffs. 17 THE COURT: Hello. MR. GOULD: Benjamin Gould, from Keller Rohrback, also 18 19 here for plaintiffs. 20 THE COURT: I like your fancy look up on the screen. 21 That's smart. That's the first time I've seen that. 22 MR. LOESER: That's so you can't see that we're, you 23 know, in bars and restaurants. THE CLERK: And for defendants? 24 25 MR. SNYDER: Yes. Good afternoon -- or good morning,

Your Honor. Nice to see you all.

It's Gibson, Dunn for the Facebook defendants. Orin Snyder, Deborah Stein, Joshua Lipshutz, Russell Falconer, and Martie Kutscher Clark.

THE COURT: All right. The gang's all here. Big group. Sounds like Judge Corley has -- has gotten you all under control, and I'm glad to hear that.

I'm not sure there's anything we need to discuss with regard to case management. I'm not going to get involved in any -- any, you know, disputes that you may currently have about discovery. That's all for Judge Corley.

So I think probably the only thing to discuss is this motion to amend the complaint. And I guess I'll start with the plaintiffs. And I'm going to try to be as blunt as I can about this.

I have a very hard time imagining that I would ever conclude that it's appropriate to bring claims on behalf of all Facebook users in the UK. I have a very hard time imagining that I would conclude that that's our business rather than the business of the court system in the UK.

So, you know, to me, I think the only question is whether I should be denying the motion for leave to amend the complaint now on futility grounds or whether there is any further development that's needed to allow me to fully consider the question of where these claims should be such that I should

grant the motion for leave to amend and then consider it on
either a -- you know, consider this issue on either an
accelerated motion to dismiss schedule or maybe it's probably a
forum non conveniens motion.

Maybe there needs to be a little bit of factual
development first. I'm not really sure. But, you know, in the

development first. I'm not really sure. But, you know, in the end maybe -- so maybe we could start with just why would it be appropriate for us to adjudicate, in a court in the United States, the question of whether Facebook violated the privacy rights of all of its UK users?

Why would that be appropriate?

MR. LOESER: Your Honor, Derek Loeser for the plaintiffs. I think that -- certainly appreciate and understand the concerns that you've expressed. I do think that what's different here, and the reason why we have added UK plaintiffs, is that the contract that Facebook had with its UK users had a forum selection clause and a choice-of-law provision for California law.

So, you know, another way of really looking at this issue, and I think kind of where the rubber --

THE COURT: Could I interrupt and ask a --

MR. LOESER: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- quick question about that?

Are you saying that the UK is the only country where Facebook had a contract with its users to -- that specified

Case 3:18-md-02843-VC Document 481 Filed 07/21/20 Page 6 of 32 that disputes would be resolved in California courts and under 1 California law? 2 MR. LOESER: No, no. 3 THE COURT: Why didn't you add -- why didn't you add 4 5 all Facebook users in France or all Facebook users in Australia? Why didn't you add all Facebook users worldwide? 6 7 I mean, I'm guessing that if they had this provision in UK specifying that California law applied and that the forum was 8 in California, I'm quessing, at the same time, they had that in 9 most, if not all, countries. 10 11 So why did you pick the UK? Why didn't you add all Facebook -- propose a class action on behalf of all Facebook 12 users worldwide? 13

MR. LOESER: And, Your Honor, in Apple, for example, that's what the plaintiffs did. Here, on the other hand, we exercised restraint and we decided to add a UK subclass because of the origin of the scandal in the UK.

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It was *The Guardian* that broke the Cambridge Analytica story, and there was a whole lot of attention --

THE COURT: Wait a minute. You included UK Facebook users because a UK publication broke the story about Cambridge Analytica?

MR. LOESER: And a lot of attention by UK users on these issues, and we were contacted by UK plaintiffs who were interested in pursuing these claims. You know, people --

THE COURT: Okay. Well, if it's appropriate to adjudicate -- if it's appropriate to bring a class action on behalf of UK users, then why wouldn't it be appropriate to have a worldwide class action?

MR. LOESER: It may well be. And that could be something that other plaintiffs' counsel could have chosen to do. We, however, wanted to stay focused on UK and the United States, and we felt that it was -- frankly, you know, we were trying to keep this from becoming wider than -- than it is already.

And, frankly, if other people want to bring other cases from other countries, I guess they're free to do so. But this is the complaint that we sought to pursue. And, frankly, it's hard to see how this situation would look better to Your Honor if we included 50 countries instead of one other.

THE COURT: Right. But I'm asking the question to highlight what appears to me to be the impropriety of pursuing a class action on behalf of all Facebook users from a different country.

MR. LOESER: And -- right.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. LOESER: But, Your Honor, it is the contract that Facebook had with its users that identified California law and a California forum. So perhaps there should be other classes from other countries, but it's hard to say that there's

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something inappropriate about us using the contract that Facebook has with its users to add a subclass from United Kingdom. THE COURT: So --MR. LOESER: Maybe there should be other. **THE COURT:** So if -- so but -- but your proposed plaintiff, as I understand it, was not -- Facebook changed its disclosure language or its contract or whatever we want to call it, user agreement, in the UK at a certain point. And my understanding is that your proposed plaintiff is covered by that new language, which specifies that -- what -that it's -- was it that the lawsuit had to take place in Ireland or something? MR. LOESER: Ireland or the UK or EU member state. It's gotten very complicated because of Brexit, but some combination of those things. And I do think, Your Honor, that's -- that's the right place to start. And I would ask the Court to look very carefully at the language in the new terms because -- I mean, a little discussion of how we got here is probably useful. These new terms that Facebook is now relying on were not made effective until May of 2018. So these are terms that Facebook came up with after this scandal broke and after these

THE COURT: Okay.

lawsuits started.

MR. LOESER: So what they're saying to the Court is, yes, it's true we had a forum selection clause that we wrote that selected California law and California forum, but after this scandal and after the lawsuit's filed, we put in a new clause, and we're claiming now that that clause applies to claims that already have accrued. And we think that's highly improper.

If they wanted to try and make the clause not just retroactive but apply to claims that already accrued, it was pretty simple for how they could do that. They would have to write it down and tell people. But they didn't do that.

THE COURT: But why shouldn't -- but why shouldn't the UK courts decide that question? I mean, these are -- you're alleging that Facebook violated the privacy rights of all these people in the UK. And -- and -- why -- why shouldn't the UK courts decide whether this -- this new provision should apply to them or not?

I mean, isn't it way -- doesn't -- don't the UK courts and doesn't the UK generally have a much greater interest in the answer to that question than the United States courts and the United States generally?

MR. LOESER: I would say that Your Honor has -- it would be appropriate for Your Honor to decide the question of whether California law and California forum selection clause applies, and that the claims that we've asserted are that

Facebook here in the United States misused these persons' data and shared it inappropriately with third parties. And the interest of the United States, and California in particular, to resolve this dispute is, in our view, the weightiest interest.

But I really do think that what Facebook is asking you to do is ignore the forum selection clause that they created, and they can only get there if, in fact, the clause applies to claims that already have been accrued.

And I think it would be appropriate for this Court, applying California law, to look at that clause and decide does this apply to already accrued claims or not?

I think, you know, Facebook has had a practice of using language that is not entirely clear, and this clause that they've created after this scandal broke is another example of that.

If they wanted retroactive application, if they wanted it to apply to claims that have already been accrued -- and there's sufficient and ample case law that explains how one would go about trying to have a new term applied for already accrued claims -- they just had to say it. They didn't do that.

We think this Court is the appropriate court to evaluate, under California law, the forum selection clause and the choice-of-law and decide this very specific question --

THE COURT: Why would the California law -- why would

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California law govern this, you know, agreement that -- that,
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     you know, UK Facebook users entered into with Facebook?
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              MR. LOESER: Because Facebook chose California law.
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              THE COURT: Only if this -- only if this new language
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     doesn't apply to the case; right?
          And so the first question is, we have to interpret this
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     new contract between UK Facebook users and Facebook.
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    have to ask whether this new contract prevents California law
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     from applying.
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          And why -- I don't understand why California law would
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     apply to that question as opposed to UK law.
              MR. LOESER: Well, I suppose they -- it seems to me
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     that California law would apply because we're arguing that the
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     clause choosing California law and choosing a California forum
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     is still operative. And so it's that --
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                         But isn't that question begging?
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              THE COURT:
     you have to interpret the new contract to determine whether
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     that clause is still operative; right?
              MR. LOESER: That's correct.
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                         Okay. So, I mean, my -- I quess my -- let
              THE COURT:
    me ask you one more general question on this -- on this topic.
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          Is it your argument that the -- I mean, I don't want to
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     put words in your mouth, but are you saying, look, Judge,
     you're right, you're right as a general matter, if there had
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    not previously been this language in the user agreement with
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the UK users specifying that California law applied and specifying there was a California forum, if there had never been such language, if there had not been any language at all about -- about forum or choice of law, then obviously this is a dispute that needs to be dealt with in the UK courts.

But it's just because we have this provision that either used to apply or maybe still applies that -- that highlights California law and California forum, it's for that reason that, you know, this dispute belongs here in California and that you should be the one to decide whether this dispute belongs in California. Is that right?

MR. LOESER: Your Honor, I think that that is a fair description with one caveat. And what I would add to that -- and it's certainly true that we believe that the fact that they chose California law and chose a California forum is a highly important fact and the primary reason why we are where we are.

I think it's also true, however, that our allegations relate to what we believe Facebook's parent did with user data in California. So there's a connection to this forum that goes beyond simply the choice of law and the choice of the forum, but also the conduct itself.

And it's only through discovery that we'll be able to sort out if, in fact, they somehow segregated the data and none of this information from UK plaintiffs was shared with third parties in the United States or in California.

But certainly true, when you look at this issue, the presence of a -- it's hard to underestimate the importance of the presence of Facebook choosing California and this forum.

And I also think it's important to consider the timing of this motion. You know, Facebook had just rewritten these terms when it filed the motion to dismiss here. They must have been fresh on its mind. And yet, instead of raising this issue at the beginning of the case, they've waited for this court to issue its opinion. And now it looks, to us, like they just want to start over and get another bit at the apple under some different law.

THE COURT: Well, I'm -- I'm 90 percent sure -- I
mean, I haven't dug through the -- dug through the docket to
figure it out for sure, but I'm 90 percent sure that I early on
raised a question about this UK issue, expressed some
scepticism that -- that it was appropriate to include a UK
class and said we can deal with this later.

So I'm not -- I'm not -- if my memory is correct, I don't think Facebook is to be blamed, at all, for holding off on consideration of this question.

You know, what you -- you -- what this discussion reminds me of a little bit is the discussion we had back about a year and a half ago, I think it was, regarding the Illinois case.

And I noticed that recently the California -- all seven members of the California Supreme Court disagreed with

Mr. Lipshutz on, you know, the sort of side issue that we were debating about the authority of local public prosecutors to bring actions to vindicate the interests of residents of the state.

And -- but that's really what these cases are about; right? That's why the Illinois case, brought by the Cook County prosecutor, got sent back to Illinois state court, because this was an action by the prosecutor to vindicate the interests of the citizens of Illinois; right?

And, you know, similarly, it seems here that you've brought, you know, an action to vindicate the interests of the citizens of the UK. And it just seems very strange that, you know, this court would decide what those interests are and whether and how they should be vindicated.

So, I guess, my next question to you is, is there anything more I need to know or need to get, that I don't have, to, you know, make a definitive decision on whether, you know, it's appropriate in this case to, you know, have a class action on behalf of UK plaintiffs?

MR. LOESER: Sure. I guess one other thought, Your

Honor -- and, of course, I don't mean to put words into your

mouth either, but what I hear you saying is that we wouldn't be

here if not for the California choice-of-law provision and the

California forum selection, and that's the reason why the

plaintiffs have asserted this claim on behalf of UK users in

the United States --

And I guess I would say to you, what would be the situation if they hadn't tried to replace these terms in 2018 and strip away accrued claims?

And I assume that where the Court would be is the Court would be saying, well, Facebook chose a California forum and a California choice-of-law provision, it must have done so intentionally with the aim of having these claims heard in California.

THE COURT: I think that's -- you know, I haven't drilled down on the language of the old forum selection and choice-of-law clause, but I think you're right to say that.

And I think what I -- what I would say in response to that is, man, it seems really strange to be, you know, adjudicating these claims here in a -- in a federal court in California.

But that's what the parties agreed to, and so I guess we have to do it.

MR. LOESER: And I guess that's the rub for us, Your Honor, is that, given that, I think the Court -- it would make sense and it would be important for the Court to take a close look at the mechanism Facebook is using to now rid itself of the decision that it made for where it wanted its claims litigated.

And the mechanism Facebook is using now is a piece of writing that they came up with after these claims had accrued

that, in their view, eliminates these claims without actually saying that. And I just think that this court and California and the United States does have a strong interest in making sure that this type of, you know, sneakiness, frankly -- this is how it looks to us -- doesn't end up defining the rights and obligations of Facebook and its users.

Because I do think that, Your Honor, we would be in a different place if this 2018 language said what some of the case law -- and we've cited cases like *Trudeau v. Google*, and there's some others as well -- that, you know, if you had written in the language to make it express what you were trying to do, okay, there might be other limitations, like the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which Your Honor discussed in the motion to dismiss, but at least you would have plainly notified users of what you were trying to do.

And, instead, what they've done here is, after the fact, rewrite the language and try and strip away from the users the benefit of the bargain that they created.

So I think that Your Honor --

THE COURT: And it's the rights -- and it's the rights of the people in the UK that we're talking about, so what -- what better court to consider those questions than the court in the UK?

But -- but I guess the -- the question, though, is, is there -- what more do you think I need, that I don't have, that

I haven't been given, if anything, to decide the -- you know,
the question of forum non conveniens, for example?

MR. LOESER: Yeah, I think it's -- it's well covered in our brief.

There is one other case I came across, when briefing, that I thought was interesting, that might be helpful for Your Honor, and that's Eiess, E-i-e-s-s, v. USAA Federal Savings

Bank, 404 F.Supp.3d 1240, at 1250 through 51. It's a

Judge Chen case from the Northern District of California 2019.

And what I found interesting about that case is it has to do with a subject that Your Honor discussed in the motion to dismiss order, and that's unilateral modifications of a contract.

And the reasoning -- while that's not entirely the exact circumstance here, what the case talks about is specifically the language that a company would need to utilize in order to have new terms apply to accrued claims.

And what the case decides is that that's the kind of thing that needs to be expressly done or it would be barred by the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Here that same -- to me, just as a matter of contract interpretation, it's the same rationale.

Look, I understand what Facebook's trying to do here.

They should have done it expressly. The way they've done it,

the way they've stripped away this forum and this Court's

effort or this Court's ability to review their conduct seems somewhat inappropriate to us based upon how unclear and ambiguous the language they used is.

To go back to where you started this, Your Honor, I would simply say it does make sense to us, given that this is a motion to amend, given the plethora of cases indicating that merits decisions, substantive decisions, shouldn't happen at that stage but, instead, should involve more complete briefing, that it would make sense to -- if Your Honor is inclined to not grant the motion, to wait for a later point in which some of these factual issues, such as the meaning of this clause, can be further developed.

THE COURT: So are you suggesting -- I mean, in the briefing I think it was, you know, grant our motion to amend and then consider, you know, a -- consider separately, you know, a motion to transfer, dismiss for forum non conveniens, or whatever. But now you're suggesting something different, and I want to ask if there's a meaningful difference.

You seem to be suggesting, well, just don't rule on this motion to amend until we have time to do some further factual development. And then if you conclude after that that amendment would be futile, just go ahead and deny our motion for leave to amend.

Is that what you're saying would be the preferable way to approach this?

MR. LOESER: That is -- that is not -- maybe I misspoke. That's not what I was suggesting, though, hearing you say that, it's an interesting idea.

THE COURT: Well, I'm just wondering because I don't -- what I haven't looked into is, you know, what are the rules about when -- if I were to grant this motion for leave to amend, would that open the floodgates again, you know, in terms of allowing the defendant to move to dismiss any claim in the case?

MR. LOESER: I would think not and I would hope not, and I think you could condition your order so that it doesn't allow that.

THE COURT: I don't know. I mean, I have a vague recollection seeing, a few years ago, that if you grant a motion for leave to amend, even if it's a, you know, on a technical thing, that it gives the plaintiff -- the defendant the right to make arguments they made before about why it should be dismissed.

Now, I don't -- I don't know if that's right, but I have --

MR. LOESER: I guess I have two answers.

One, you have a lot of power and you can say that that's not going to happen; and, two, if you think that is going to happen, then your suggestion before about not ruling on this motion seems like a good one.

We're pretty far down the track on the claims that you've upheld in the discovery, and I would hate to see us have to go back to what was already a very lengthy briefing process on those claims.

THE COURT: So, as a practical matter, as long as you've had an opportunity to put everything in front of me on the question of whether this -- you know, the UK class should be in the UK or here, doesn't matter whether I deny the motion for leave to amend as futile or grant it and then rule in Facebook's favor on their motion -- their non conveniens motion or whatever it's going to be.

MR. LOESER: I guess from a -- I mean, this is just me thinking out loud. The standards for leave to amend are as liberal as standards get. And just in terms of the law and how the law should work and develop, I think it would be odd to deny leave to amend here based upon a forum non conveniens motion that hasn't been filed.

I don't why Facebook didn't file a forum non conveniens motion a year ago. I don't know why they didn't say anything about this defense in their answer, why they admitted in their answer that California law applies and the California forum applies. I don't understand why Facebook didn't go through and just file the motion a while ago, but they didn't.

If they want to seek to have this case transferred under forum non conveniens, they should file that motion. They

should not attempt to do that in an opposition to a motion to 1 I guess that's how I would see the sensible way for 2 this --3 THE COURT: Yeah, but if there's -- if there's no 4 5 scenario in which I would deny their forum non conveniens motion, then, you know, that seems like that is the definition 6 7 of futility. And you can -- you can deny a motion for leave to amend on futility alone. 8 So, anyway, let me hear briefly from Facebook if there are 9 any burning points you all need to make. 10 11 MR. FALCONER: Good morning, Your Honor. May it please the Court, Russ Falconer on behalf of Facebook. 12 I would like to start, if I could, with the suggestion 13 that the decision to amend the terms of service in the UK was 14 15 driven in any way by anything that was happening in this 16 litigation. That's -- that's not true. The terms were amended 17 in response to and in anticipation of GDPR taking effect in the 18 UK. There were a variety of business and legal and regulatory 19 reasons for that change. And it's --20 In other words, it's not all about -- it's 21 THE COURT: not all about them. 22 MR. FALCONER: It's not, believe it or not. 23

And it's a funny thing. Usually it's a fair thing, not an

unfair thing, for a UK plaintiff to be told, You don't have to

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come all the way to California to sue anymore. You can sue in your own backyard. Usually, that's a good thing, not a bad thing.

But I'd like to address, briefly, Mr. Loeser's point that this clause, this choice-of-law and forum selection clause, the way it's written is not broad enough to capture claims that accrued before the terms of service were agreed to between Facebook and the plaintiffs.

There's very strong and directly on point case law under California law that addresses this question. And just to --

THE COURT: Well, do you agree that California law applies to this question?

MR. FALCONER: We are not sure. We don't agree that it definitely does. And our -- the 44.1 declaration that we put in for Mr. Kennelly, the UK law expert, in paragraphs 77 and 78 of his declaration, he offers his opinion why, under UK or Irish law, the clause would be read as applying to claims that accrued before the parties signed the terms.

And the analysis is actually very similar to the analysis under California law, because what the clause says is that the plaintiffs agree that the choice-of-law and forum selection clause applies to any claim they have that arises out of or relates to these terms or the Facebook products which encompasses their use of the platform and all the related services.

And the key language in there is "any claim," not "some claims." Not just claims arising under the agreement but claims that relate to it, and claims that relate to not just the terms of service but their use of the products.

And the Second Circuit in the *TradeComet.com* case that we cited in our opposition, applying California law, says those are the key textural provisions that make this clause broad enough in scope to apply to claims both before the clause was signed and after.

And one of the case -- the main case that the Second

Circuit relied on to support that analysis was the *Verisign*case from this court, again also cited in our opposition brief.

So, as a matter of California law, those cases both say that a clause -- a broad forum clause that's worded just the way this one is applies to pre-signing and post-signing claims. Doesn't matter the time when they accrued.

The case that Mr. Loeser cited, the *Eiess versus USAA* case, that's a unilateral modification case, which is, as he -- you know, he candidly admitted, that's not the situation here.

The situation we have here is contemporaneous mutual assent. And this was explained in the declaration we submitted for Mr. Duffey, on behalf of Facebook, that everyone in the UK who used Facebook between April and May of 2018 was required to go through what they called this GDPR user engagement flow, read through a bunch of screens and disclosures. And then the

very last one said, By continuing to use Facebook, you're agreeing to our updated terms of service. Here's a link to those terms. And by -- you need to click this button that says "Accept." And by clicking "Accept," you agree to be bound by these new terms.

And Mr. Duffey explained in his declaration that after May 25th, 2018, if you were a UK user in Facebook and you had not clicked "Accept" to agree to those terms, you were no longer allowed to use the service.

In the second amended complaint -- the proposed second amended complaint, the complaint affirmatively alleges that both of these UK plaintiffs used Facebook before May of 2018 and continue to use it to this day, which tells us that they necessarily had to click "Accept" and affirmatively agree to these new terms in May or April of 2018.

So the unilateral modification case law that he referenced just doesn't apply, you know, on the facts that are present here.

The other -- the other point, Your Honor --

THE COURT: The main thing I want to hear from you on, I think, is, is there anything to their argument that, you know, even if I'm inclined to think that, you know, amendment would be futile, I better -- the better approach is, nonetheless, to grant leave to amend to -- you know, to allow further factual development, or to hold off on, you know,

ruling on the motion for leave to amend until there has been further development?

MR. FALCONER: No, there's no need for further factual development here because there are no facts that need developing.

Everything that's relevant is in front of the Court on the -- on the motion for leave. And this is an important point. None of it's disputed. There's no allegation in the complaint and there's no argument in the reply brief that these two plaintiffs didn't agree to these terms, that the choice-of-law and forum selection clauses are invalid or not enforceable. It's conceded that they apply to all the claims in this lawsuit.

And maybe the most important point, they do not deny that they assented and agreed to be bound by these terms. Those are all the facts the Court needs to enforce either or both of these clauses and deny leave to amend under forum non conveniens futility.

THE COURT: Do I need to -- do I need to -- do I need to conclude that they're enforceable, or is it sufficient to conclude that they -- they exist and -- and that the UK -- you know, the UK court should decide whether they apply or not?

MR. FALCONER: Yeah, I think the UK court would and should decide, in the first instance, whether they apply.

And again, I think, as Mr. Kennelly explains in pretty

great detail in his declaration, there is a very robust data privacy regime in the UK, under GDPR, that gets codified into both Irish and UK law, under which those countries have a very strong domestic interest in both enforcing the substantive rights the GDPR creates and in giving consumer users the right to seek redress for any violations or alleged violations of those rights in the courts of their home forum.

So I think the fact that these terms are there and, you know, subject to decision, I think the Court has what it needs to conclude that these are enforceable, but it's also absolutely a cognizable basis to deny leave to amend to say that enforceability question, given that this is a contract between an Irish entity and two UK citizens, it makes sense that would be decided by a UK court.

THE COURT: Has anybody sued Facebook for this stuff in the UK or in Europe?

MR. FALCONER: I -- I don't know if there are individual plaintiff lawsuits. I don't want to say anything incorrect here. There have been some regulatory investigations through Irish and UK regulators, but I just don't -- I don't want to give a wrong answer on whether any individual folks have brought suit over there.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FALCONER: If I could, just briefly, the last thing I would like to refer Your Honor to is the case -- Ninth

Circuit case that we cited in our opposition that -- it's the in re -- sorry, not *In re Flash Memory*. The -- apologies. The *Finsa Portafolios*, case where the Ninth Circuit affirmed a District Court's decision to deny a motion for leave to amend as futile when there was a forum selection clause that selected an overseas forum.

So I think that's a good indicator there's no legal barrier to the Court resolving this issue in the current procedural posture rather than having another round of briefing on an issue that's already fully teed up.

THE COURT: Mr. Loeser, let me just ask you one final question, which is: Can you articulate for me what I would need, that I don't have now, to decide whether this case -- whether the -- the UK class belongs here or in the UK?

MR. LOESER: Well, Your Honor, one thing we don't have now is discovery on whether UK users' data was misused in the United States and that the third-party sharing that occurred with business partners and apps didn't involve data from the UK. That would seem to be a critical bit of information.

THE COURT: So you're saying if -- if Facebook users' data was misused -- if UK Facebook users' data was misused in the United States, that would change the equation.

MR. LOESER: That would change the equation if the new terms applied and applied to accrued claims. I think that if, in fact, the effort to have these new terms apply to approved

claims doesn't work for them, then I think that's less important because Facebook has chosen this forum, and there shouldn't be anything else that we need to discuss when deciding whether to have a case here.

Okay.

THE COURT:

Other than, you know, discovery into the question of whether UK Facebook user data was misused in the United States, is there anything that I need, that I don't have, to decide this -- the question of whether this -- you know, the UK class should be here or in the UK?

What else? What else?

MR. LOESER: Well, just again thinking out loud, they've submitted a declaration that has all kinds of extrinsic evidence such as this GD -- whatever the initials are, process for flow engagement.

It's interesting that they describe -- they confer from people continuing to use the site that they clicked I accept.

I am a little puzzled why they didn't submit some evidence that people actually did accept. I, frankly, don't know the answer one way or the other. I just thought it was a little bit odd in the materials that they submitted.

So in terms of that question, Your Honor, that's what I can think of now. You have, you know, eight other people that could pipe in with other ideas.

I would like to just go back for one second, though, Your Honor, to something that Mr. Falconer said, because I do think

it puts into clear focus the Court's task here.

Mr. Falconer was arguing to you the breadth of the 2018

New Terms and what they mean. So Facebook is asking you to
look at those terms and adjudicate that they apply to already
accrued claims. And we're asking you to do the same thing.

And I think that if the Court does that, the Court will see that the law is not what Mr. Falconer says it is. And, instead, there's case law such as *Trudeau v. Google*, which, if I could screen share, I would just put up. But I have it on my screen, so I'll just read to you.

That's a case involving an arbitration clause, which most of the cases they cite involve arbitration clause, where there is a -- already a preference for having those clauses apply retroactively, which isn't the case here.

But in that case there was an argument that this -- these new terms that imposed an arbitration agreement applied to already accrued claims. And the Court evaluated that, and the reason why it found that they did was that -- and I'll just read this to you at -- I should give you the cite. It is 349 F.Supp.3d 869, Northern District of California 2018.

And at pincite 878, the Court says:

"At the same time, Trudeau recognizes that Section 13(a)(2), quote, seems to imbue Section 13(a) with retroactive effect by providing that the new dispute resolution clause applies to, *inter alia*, claims that

arose before customer or advertiser first accepted any version of these terms containing an arbitration provision."

So I do think, Your Honor, when you look at the case law that Facebook has provided to you and you look at the case law that we've provided to you, it's quite clear that if what Facebook wants to do is have these new terms apply to already accrued claims, it has to be expressly put.

And I think since Facebook is asking you to evaluate the clause and we're asking you to evaluate the clause, and, frankly, the Court needs to evaluate the clause when considering the *forum non conveniens* argument, it would be appropriate to consider what's missing from the language Facebook has put in front of you and why they can't accomplish what they're trying to accomplish here.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll get it -- I'll give it some further thought and issue a ruling.

And, as I said, I'm not getting involved in any discussions about discovery, but on the case management side, is there anything else that anybody needs to talk about?

MR. LOESER: Your Honor, I'll just put in one plug for the great work that Magistrate Judge Corley is doing. I think the parties have made tremendous progress. We're getting along better, which is nice, and that we've learned a lot about each other through this.

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We have a lot of fights still, and a lot of disagreements
 1
     about the scope of discovery, but things are operating much
 2
     more smoothly.
 3
              MR. SNYDER: We second that, Your Honor. She's been
 4
 5
     wonderful. Thank you.
 6
              THE COURT: Great.
              MR. LIPSHUTZ: I would just like to point out that you
 7
     accurately predicted the California Supreme Court would
 8
     overturn that decision, so I just want to make sure the record
 9
10
     is clear on that.
                                Accurately predicted they would
11
              THE COURT: Yes.
     disagree with you.
12
              MR. LIPSHUTZ: To be fair, they also disagreed with
13
     the Court of Appeals, but.
14
15
              MR. SNYDER: It was a valiant effort by Mr. Lipshutz.
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              THE COURT: It certainly was.
                 Thanks very much. Have a good day.
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18
          (Counsel thank the Court.)
          (At 9:43 a.m. the proceedings were adjourned.)
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. DATE: Tuesday, July 21, 2020 Kathering Sullivan Katherine Powell Sullivan, CSR #5812, RMR, CRR U.S. Court Reporter